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et al.: Recent Decisions

RECENT DECISIONS
AUTOMOBILES-Guest Statute-The non-driving owner-occupant of an automobile is not a "guest" within the meaning of the
Illinois guest statute. Summers v. Summers (Ill. 1968).
The defendant was driving an automobile owned by the plaintiff in which the plaintiff was riding. The defendant, distracted by plaintiff's talking, caused the car to leave the road.
The car struck a culvert and the plaintiff was injured. The
plaintiff brought suit to recover damages for personal injuries
sustained in the accident alleging that she was a "passenger"
in the car when the accident occurred and not a "guest" within
the meaning of the Illinois guest statute. 1 The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff on a jury verdict of $12,000.2

On appeal the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the trial court, holding that an owner-occupant is not a guest
within the meaning of the Illinois guest statute. Summers 'V.
Summers, 239 N.E.2d 795 (Ill. 1968).
The majority of jurisdictions hold that the non-driving owner-occupant of an automobile is not a "guest" within the meaning of the guest statutes.3 This view is based to a large extent
1. ILL RLV. STAT. Ch. 95/2, § 9-201 (1958).
No person riding in or upon a motor vehicle or motorcycle as a
guest without a payment for such ride, or while engaged in a joint
enterprise with the owner or driver of such . .. nor his personal

representative in the event of the death of such guest, shall have
a cause of action for damages against the driver or operator of
such . . . or its owner or his employee or agent for injury, death

or loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been
caused by the wilful and wanton misconduct of the driver or operator of such

. . .

or its owner or his employee or agent and unless

such wilful and wanton misconduct contributed to the injury,
death or loss for which the action is brought.
2. On appeal, the Appellate Court, Fourth Circuit, reversed the judgment,
holding as a matter of law that plaintiff was a "guest" within the Illinois
guest statute, and therefore her action based on simple negligence was barred.
Summers v. Summers, 85 Ill. App. 2d 182, 228 N.E.2d 539 (1967).
3. Baldwin v. Hill, 315 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1963) (construing the Michigan
guest statute) ; Wilson v. Workman, 192 F. Supp. 852 (D. Del. 1961) ; Collie
v. Aust, 173 Cal. App. 2d 793, 342 P.2d 998 (1959); Gledhill v. Connecticut
Co., 121 Conn. 102, 183 A. 379 (1936); Peterson v. Winn, 84 Idaho 523, 373
P.2d 925 (1962); Degenstein v. Ehrman, 145 N.W.2d 493 (N.D. 1966); Henline v. Wilson, 111 Ohio App. 515, 174 N.E.2d 122 (1960); Lorch v. Eglin,
369 Pa. 314, 85 A.2d 841 (1952); Parker v. Leavitt, 201 Va. 919, 114 S.E.2d
732 (1960).
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on the legislative intent behind the enactment of the guest
statutes: i.e. that only the donor should be protected from the

ungrateful recipient of a gratuitous ride.4 The courts deciding
this line of cases have rejected any suggestion that the legislative intent was actually to protect the real party in interest, the
insurance companies, by preventing collusive or "friendly"
suits.5
The minority view is that the non-driving owner-occupant is
a "guest" within the meaning of the guest statutes. The states
that follow the minority position take a more penetrating view
of the legislative purpose behind the enactment of guest statutes.
These states, while admitting the validity of the majority position on legislative intent, find a second and, they feel, motivating purpose behind the statutes-the prevention of collusive or
"friendly" suits.6
Both sides in the controversy have defined the word "guest."
The majority has used Webster's definition.7 The minority's
view is that the dictionary definition of "guest" favored by the
majority is obsolete and should be made more relevant to current
legal thought by incorporating the purpose of the statute into
4. Degenstein v. Ehrman, 145 N.W.2d 493, 502 (N.D. 1966). Illinois has
expressed this view. Clarke v. Storchak, 384 Ill. 564, 52 N.E.2d 229 (1943).
The effect of extending the immunity afforded by the guest statute to include
the owner-occupant would be to limit his recovery from the driver to damages
sustained as a result of wilful and wanton misconduct of the driver.
5. The guest statute does not preclude collusion. It is still possible to fabricate evidence to support the higher degree of fault required by statute. Degenstein v. Ehrman, 145 N.W.2d 493, 502 (N.D. 1966).
6. Phelps v. Benson, 252 Minn. 457, 90 N.W.2d 533 (1958). The minority
view has received support from at least one legal scholar. "The chief argument
advanced in favor of [guest statutes] has been that in guest cases the insurer,
who is required to pay the damages, is peculiarly exposed to collusion between
the injured guest and a host anxious to see compensation paid, so long as he
does not have to pay it. .. " W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
191 (3d ed. 1964). New York, a state not having a guest statute, has seen fit
to recognize this same legislative objective. "The object of . . . the guest
statute, it has been said, is 'to prevent the fraudulent assertion of claims by
the passengers, in collusion with the drivers, against insurance companies.'"
Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482-83, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743 750 (1963).
7. Gledhill v. Connecticut Co., 121 Conn. 102, 105, 183 A. 379, 380 (1936).
There the court said:
In Webster's New International Dictionary, a 'guest' is defined as
'a person entertained in one's house or at one's table; a visitor
entertained without pay; hence, a person to whom the hospitality
of a home, club, etc., is extended.' As used in the statute the term
imports that the person riding in a motor vehicle is a recipient of
the hospitality of the owner or driver.
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the definition.8 By limiting the definition of "guest" to its ordinary meaning, the minority of cases argue, the majority has
effectively prevented any possible extension of the definition to
include, as a "guest", the owner-occupant of his own car. Under
this view, therefore, it is apparently impossible to be a "guest"
in your own automobile.
The court in Summers distinguished Illinois' basic principle
of statutory construction from that underlying several state
decisions which espoused the minority view." These cases, the
Summers court pointed out, were decided in states having a
rule of statutory construction opposite that of the Illinois approach. In these states, statutes in derogation of common law
were construed liberally.1 0 Illinois required such statutes to be
strictly construed. The Summers court felt this was an important difference.
At the same time, the Summeres court failed to point out that
at least three of the jurisdictions which it cited for the majority
view"- had the requirement of liberal statutory construction.
Additionally, in HenZine v. Wison,12 an earlier Illinois case
following the majority position, the court had stated that it
would have probably arrived at the same conclusion as the
minority jurisdictions if Illinois had not required strict construction of statutes in derogation of common law.18 The
futility of placing much reliance on such distinctions is apparent. Summers employed the argument to bolster its view of
legislative intent; other state decisions' 4 ignored the same dis8. "The definition of a guest in the Gledhill case is taken largely from old

cases dealing with guests in public inns. It adopts a dictionary definition of
guest which has little application to the objects which the guest statutes seek
to accomplish." Phelps v. Benson, 252 Minn. 457, 465, 90 N.W2d 533, 539
(1958).
9. Murray v. Lang, 252 Iowa 260, 106 N.W.2d 643 (1960); Phelps v.
Benson, 252 Minn. 457, 90 N.W.2d 533 (1958); Schlim v. Gau, 80 S.D. 403,
125 N.W.2d 174 (1963).
10. Phelps and Schlim were construing the South Dakota rule on construction of statutes in derogation of the common law. S.D. CODE § 65.0202(1)
(1939). The Murray decision was based on a similar Iowa rule. IowA CODE
ANN.

§ 4.2 (1958).

11. Collie v. Aust, 173 Cal.
Winn, 84 Idaho 523, 373 P.2d
493 (N.D.1966).
12. 111 Ohio App. 515, 174
13. Id., at 520, 174 N.E.2d
14. Collie v. Aust, 173 Cal.
Win, 84 Idaho 523, 373 P.2d
493 (N.D. 1966).

App. 2d 793, 342 P.2d 998 (1959) ; Peterson v.
925 (1962) ; Degenstein v. Ehrman, 145 N.W.2d
N.E.2d 122 (1960).
at 125 (dictum).
App. 2d 793, 342 P.2d 998 (1959) ; Peterson v.
925 (1962) ; Degenstein v. Ehrman, 145 N.W.2d
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tinction to arrive at the identical conclusion as the Summers
court; and WTRson permitted the same rule of strict construction
to prevent what would have been a finding in line with the minority approach. It would appear, therefore, that the court in
Summers used this maxim of statutory construction merely as
collateral support for its more limited view of legislative purpose and could have omitted it from its holding.
The Summers court, therefore, based its decision on a strict
interpretation of legislative intent. The court followed the
majority in recognizing a legislative intent which restricted
coverage of the guest statutes. The guest statutes, it reasoned,
protected only the donor of a gratuitous ride. It did not extend
to protect one driving an automobile in which the donor-owner
was riding. Finally, it refused to accompany the minority so
far as to give effect to any intention of preventing collusive
suits; although the Summers case appears to present the exact
5
situation against which the minority position is directed.,
Some writers have suggested that the best way to deal with
cases in this area is to handle them on a case by case basis rather
than being bound by a set rule. 6 This, of course, has the disadvantage of lacking the certainty which a uniform rule provides. At least one state has reacted positively to avoid the
result reached by the Illinois court in the Summers case-California amended its guest statute to include non-driving owneroccupants in its classification of "guest."' 7 Connecticut, one of
the early guest statute states, is no longer confronted with this
question since its guest statute has been repealed.' 8 Ignoring
these developments, the Summers court cited California and
Connecticut as holding the majority view on this question.' 9
South Carolina has not as yet decided the issue. That it also
follows the rule of strict statutory construction, may suggest
15. At this time the plaintiff and the defendant were contemplating engagement and later were married-a situation which lends itself to a collusive or
"friendly" suit.
16. Comment, 38 U. Coro. L. Rnv. 346 (1966); 17 S.W.LJ. 298 (1963).
17. CAL. VEHr. CODE § 17158 (Supp. 1968-69), antending CAL. VEE. CODE
§ 17158 (1959). For an explanation of why California amended this act see,

Brunn, California Personal Injury Damage Awards To Married Persons, 13

U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 587, 618 (1966).
18. Former CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 1628 (1930) repealed by omission
from the 1949 revision of the General Statutes of Connecticut. For an explanation see, 17 S.W.LJ. 298 n.45 (1963).
19. Summers v. Summers, 239 N.E.2d 795 (Ill. 1968).
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the Summers result. 20 At least one legal writer in South Carolina, however, has recognized, as the stimulus behind the guest
statute, the insurance lobby's attempt to prevent collusive suits.21
It is not clear, therefore, what the South Carolina court will do
when confronted with this question.
D. CRAvENs

RAvEmm

20. University of South Carolina v. Elliott, 248 S.C. 218, 149 S.E.2d 433
(1966).
21. Blackwell, The South Carolina Guest Statute, 4 S=.oN Socy Part II,

12 (1940). "The South Carolina statute .. , is a copy of the Connecticut
statute, and was enacted in 1930." Id. at 13.
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INSURANCE-Covenant Not To Sue- Recovery against excess
liability insurer not precluded by release given primary liability
insurer. Deblrn v. Beaton (N. J. 1968).
Christina Deblon, widow of Charles Deblon, instituted suit
against both the owner and the driver of a car in which her
husband, the decedent, was a passenger, charging negligence
and claiming damages under both the Survival Act and the
Wrongful Death Act. The owner of the car, Catherine Foley,
was the named insured under a liability policy issued by the
Allstate Insurance Company, which contained a $50,000 limit of
bodily injury liability for one person. The driver, Leslie
Beaton, was covered by this policy under the usual omnibus
clause. Leslie Beaton was also the named insured under a
liability policy issued by Jersey Insurance Company of New
York, which policy, if effective, would be "excess insurance" up
to its $10,000 limit under the standard "other insurance" clause.
Christina Deblon, in all capacities as plaintiff, executed a "covenant not to sue on claim," in consideration of $46,500. She purported to release only Beaton, Foley and Allstate Insurance
Company, reserving the right to proceed against Jersey Insurance Company of New York. She neither released Jersey nor
waived any rights against Beaton and Foley as named assureds
under the Jersey Policy. Jersey contended that it was legally
impossible for plaintiff to release the individuals and the primary insurance carrier, while retaining the right to recover
from the excess insurance carrier. The court concluded that the
release given upon settlement with the primary liability insurer
did not preclude further recovery against the excess insurer
even though the instrument stated it released claims against the
insureds. Deblon v. Beaton, 247 A.2d 172 (N.J. 1968).
At common law, a valid release of one joint tort-feasor was
usually a release of all the joint wrongdoers and was a bar to
a suit against any of them for the same wrong.1 At the base
of this rule was the theory that there could be but one compensation for the joint wrong. If the injured party was paid by
one of the wrongdoers for the injury he had suffered, each
wrongdoer being responsible for the whole damage, his cause
1. 76 C.J.S. Release § 50 (1952).
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of action was satisfied in exchange for a release, and he could
not proceed against the others.2 Thus a release of one joint
wrongdoer released all. But when the consideration received
for the release was not full compensation for the injury, the
purpose for the harsh rule did not exist. To allow for this, the
covenant not to sue was developed. 3 The covenant not to sue one
or less than all joint tort-feasors does not, therefore, release all
4
tort-feasors and will not bar an action against the others.
In deciding whether an instrument is a covenant not to sue or
a release, courts have allowed the intention of the parties to
govern.5 Thus, instruments which specifically provide that they
shall not affect the covenantor's rights against other joint tortfeasors, and releases which contain a reservation of the plaintiff's rights against the other joint tort-feasors are generally
construed as covenants not to sue.6 If the instrument states
specifically that it is a covenant not to sue, courts cannot disregard the obvious intention of the parties and construe the
instrument as a release.7
The court in Deblon had no trouble in construing the instrument as a covenant not to sue. The instrument specifically stated
that it was a covenant and also that it reserved the right to
proceed against the defendant, the Jersey Insurance Company.
From this the court found that the intention of the parties was
"to release Beaton and Foley only to the extent of their personal assets and their Allstate insurance coverage, while retaining a claim to their Jersey coverage.""
Jersey argued that even if this were a covenant not to sue,
plaintiff could not recover from them. Jersey's liability under
2. Dougherty v. California Kettleman Oil Royalties, Inc., 13 Cal. 2d 174,
88 P.2d 690, 693 (1939).

3. Annot, 73 A.L.R.2d 403 (1960).

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. Contra, Goldstein v. Gilbert, 125 W. Va. 250, 23 S.E.2d 606 (1942),
in which the court, applying state law, held that an instrument referred to
as a covenant not to sue, executed by the plaintiff and expressly reserving the
right to recover against any other person for the automobile collision, constituted a release of plaintiff's right of action and barred an action against a
joint tort-feasor.
8. Deblon v. Beaton, 103 NJ. Super. 345, 247 A.2d 172, 174 (1968).
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its policy was "to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages."*
It reasoned that its insured could not become "legally obligated
to pay" anything because of the covenant not to sue. 10 Thus, if
its insured was not obligated, neither was Jersey. The court
refused to construe this phrase so narrowly because of the public
policy involved in construing a liability insurance policy to afford the broadest possible coverage, and because the covenant
not to sue did not release Jersey's insured in toto.11
The South Carolina Supreme Court has never ruled on the
validity of a covenant not to sue. 12 However, there are indications that such a covenant would be recognized in South Carolina.18 The latest indication of the probable South Carolina law
on the issue is found in the South Carolina federal district court
decision of Ayers v. Pastine Amustment o.14 Ayers involved
a tort action based on an alleged conspiracy in violation of an
anti-trust statute brought against distributees and exhibitors
of motion pictures. Eight distributors were dismissed pursuant
to a covenant not to sue. The two remaining defendant exhibitors claimed that the covenant not to sue was, in legal effect,
a general release; "so that the execution of the settlement documents, when coupled with the dismissal of the actions with prejudice as to the defendant distributors [led] to a like dismissal with
prejudice" as to the two remaining defendants. 15 The court held
that the instrument was a covenant not to sue and as such did
not release the two remaining defendants.' 6 The court stated
that the intent of the parties was the major controlling factor in
determining whether the instrument was a covenant or a release,
and further indicated that even if the instrument were construed
as a release, the plaintiff's express reservation of his rights
against all except the convenantees therein, precluded the defendant's discharge from liability.' 7
9. Id., 247 A2d at 175.
10. Id.
11. Id. Since the court had construed the instrument as releasing only

Beaton's and Foley's personal assets, it thus followed that they were not released in toto.
12. Ayers v. Pastime Amusement Co., 259 F. Supp. 358, 360 (D.S.C. 1966).
13. McWhirter v. Otis Elevator Co., 40 F. Supp. 11, 13 (W.D.S.C. 1941).
14. 259 F. Supp. 358 (D.S.C. 1966).
15. Id. at 359.
16. Id. at 362.
17. Id. at 362; see RESTAT=E T oF ToRTs § 885 (1939).
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When the question in Deblon is presented to the South Carolina Supreme Court, it will be one of first impression. Although its decision is not certain, the weight of the authority
cited above should be most persuasive in leading the court
toward the result reached in Delon.
JAMEs W. LoGA,
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TORTS-Duty of Care in Affirmative Conduct - Defendant
negligent and liable for injuries to third parties resulting from
placing of drunken minor employee in latter's automobile and
directing him to proceed through traffic to his home. Brockett
v. Kitheon Boyd Motor Co. (Cal. 1968).
The plaintiffs, occupants of an automobile stopped at a traffic
light, were struck by a car driven by Jimmie Leon Huff, an
intoxicated minor aged nineteen years. Huff, an employee of
the defendant company, had attended a protracted Christmas
party given by the defendant for its employees. During the
course of the party, the defendant served numerous drinks to
all employees and solicited their indulgence. Huff became
grossly intoxicated to the point of being incapable of properly
driving an automobile in traffic. In spite of this condition, the
defendant placed Huff in the automobile which he had driven
to the party and directed him to proceed through traffic to his
home. The defendant demurred to the complaint alleging,
first, that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action; and second, that there was uncertainty in that it did
not appear from the complaint how the defendant's actions
were the proximate cause of the alleged injuries. The second
ground was overruled, but the demurrer to the first ground was
sustained without leave to amend. On appeal, the demurrer was
overruled. The relationship between the minor Huff and his
employer, Kitchen Boyd Motor Company, was such that the
defendant had assumed the responsibility for the well-being and
proper conduct of the minor-not only for his protection, but
also for the protection of the general public. The defendant, by
placing an obviously drunken minor in the driver's seat of an
automobile and ordering him to go home through traffic,
initiated the tort and should be liable to anyone injured as a
consequence of it. Brockett . Kithen Boyd Motor Co., 70 Cal.
Rptr. 136 (Ct. App. 1968).
At common law an action against a tavern owner, dram
keeper, or bartender for an injury suffered by an intoxicated
patron or inflicted by such patron upon a third person was
generally denied. This denial of recovery was based either on
the ground that the consumption of the alcohol, rather than the
sale of it, was the proximate cause of intoxication, or that the
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consequent injury was not foreseeable.' A number of states
side-stepped this troublesome issue by enacting Dram Shop (or
Civil Action) laws designed to embrace all injuries produced
2
by the intoxication which resulted from the sale of alcohol.
These laws have generally imposed liability upon those who sell
or supply liquor to a minors or to an obviously intoxicated
person 4 when such person's drunkenness causes or substantially
contributes to an injury to the patron himself or to a third
person. In some states, including California, where such statutes
have not been enacted, the common law rule stands virtually
intact, 5 despite occasional judicial dissent.6 Moreover, California
follows the common law despite the contrary policy implications
of the Business and Professions Code provisions making it a
misdemeanor to sell or furnish an alcoholic beverage to a known
drunkard, an obviously intoxicated person7 or a minor."
In the absence of a dram shop statute, therefore, the California court shifted the focus from the supplying of alcohol to
the affirmative conduct of the defendant in placing the grossly
intoxicated minor in an automobile and directing him to drive
home. In California, as elsewhere, one who undertakes an affirmative act is under a duty to observe due care to avoid
unreasonable risk of harm to that class of persons who foreseeably may be injured by his conduct. As the California court said
1. Thomas v. Bruza, 151 Cal. App. 2d 150, 311 P2d 128 (Ct. App. 1957);
Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94
Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P2d 530 (Ct. App. 1949); Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal.
App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (Ct App. 1944); Belding v. Johnson, 86 Ga. 177,
12 S.E. 304 (1890); Dinger v. Lucken, 143 Ky. 850, 137 S.W. 776 (1911);
Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939).
2. Hyba v. C.A. Horneman, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 143, 23 N.E.2d 564 (1939).
3. Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1963).
4. Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d 606, appeal dismissed, 355
U.S. 15 (1957).
5. Thomas v. Bruza, 151 Cal. App. 2d 150, 311 P.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1957);
Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P2d 450 (1955); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94
Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (Ct. App. 1949); Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal.
App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (Ct. App. 1944); Belding v. Johnson, 86 Ga. 177,
12 S.E. 304 (1890); Dinger v. Lucken, 143 Ky. 850, 137 S.W. 776 (1911);
Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939). But see Berkeley v. Park,
47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1965), in which the court
acknowledged, on common law principles, a cause of action against an innkeeper serving intoxicating liquors to intoxicated persons.
6. E.g., Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955) (dissenting
opinion); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (Ct. App.
1949) (dissenting opinion).
7. CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CODE ANN. § 25602 (West 1962).
8. Id. § 25658.
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in Johmton v. Orando,9 "[h]e who undertakes to do an act must
do it with reasonable care." 10 Of the cases which illustrate the
operation of the rule, the most appropriate in the present context are those which involve the control over other human beings
who, because of social or mental maladjustments, are known to
be dangerous." In ScoZovino v. State, 2 for example, the State
of New York was held liable to a state hospital inmate for
injury inflicted by another inmate where it was known that bad
feelings existed between the two, who were nevertheless confined
in the same room. In Kusah v. McCorkle,1s the plaintiff, while
lawfully incarcerated in a county jail, was attacked and stabbed
by a prisoner in the same cell. The court held that the sheriff,
if found negligent in placing the assailant in the cell, would be
liable to the plaintiff for the tort that resulted.
In Brockett the court recognized a duty on the part of the
defendant to use care in affirmative conduct for the protection
of the minor Huff and third persons who might be injured
because of the defendant's failure to exercise such care. The
duty arose because of the voluntary relationship between the
minor and the defendant "was such that the defendant had
assumed the responsibility for the well-being and proper conduct
of the minor .... -14 While the main element of the court's
rationale seems to be the affirmative conduct doctrine, the court
repeatedly refers to the "additional facts" bearing on liability:
The defendant was the employer of Huff; Huff was a minor;
the defendant procured Huff's intoxication; the defendant's
conduct was contrary to public policy in that he aided and
abetted Huff in the crime of drunken driving.' 5
While all of these factors underscore the defendant's legal
and moral misdeeds, it is difficult to glean the specific formula
that imposes a duty upon the defendant toward a third person
in a civil contest. Though it may be true, as the court states, that
"Huff . . .committed a crime in driving the car, and he was
9. 131 Cal. App. 2d 705, 281 P2d 357 (1955).
10. Id. at 709, 281 P2d at 360.

11. See generally Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of

Another, 43 YA L.J. 886, 897-98 (1934); W. PEossER, HANDBoo: OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 345-46 (1964).
12. 187 Misc. 253, 62 N.Y.S.2d 17 (Ct. Cl. 1946), affd, 271 App. Div. 618,
67 N.Y.S.2d 202, a! 'd, 297 N.Y. 460, 74 N.E2d 174 (1947).
13. 100 Wash. 318, 170 P. 1023 (1918).
14. 70 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
15. Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 70 Cal. Rptr. 136, 139 (Ct App.
1968).
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aided and abetted by the defendant,"' 6 the plaintiff's cause of
action seemingly stems not from the defendant's criminal acts,
but from his perfunctory voluntary conduct, a civil question.
Furthermore, the court, in the same discussion, queries how the
Brockett case differs in essential facts from a case in which (a)
a defendant fires a machine gun at random down a street and
hits a pedestrian, or (b) a big game hunter captures a tiger and
later releases him in a populated area. These analogies are at
best imperfect, and even seem to betray an indifference on the
part of the court to the distinctions between negligence on the
one hand and criminal recklessness or criminal gross negligence' 7 on the other.
Finally, the court invokes yet another legal principle to but-

tress its holding-the common law doctrine of negligent entrust-

ment.18 The court reasons that since ownership of the car is
important under this doctrine only because it indicates some
right of the defendant to control the situation, that element

(ownership), which is in fact lacking here, finds its substitute
in the "other factors" which gave the defendant control of the
situation.19 This reasoning is persuasive and the entrustment
16. Id.
17. "Criminal gross negligence" is culpable or criminal when accompanied by acts of commission or omission of a wanton or willful
nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights
of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce
injury, or which made it not improbable that injury will be occasioned, and the offender knows or is charged with knowledge of
the probable result of his acts ....

BLAcK's LAw DicrioN Y 448 (4th ed. 1951).

18. Under this theory, liability is imposed upon an automobile owner who
has entrusted a car to an incompetent, reckless, or inexperienced driver if the
plaintiff can prove that his injury was proximately caused by the driver's
incompetency. Syah v. Johnson, 247 Cal. App. 2d 534, 55 Cal. Rptr. 741, 745
(Ct. App. 1966). As the Brockett opinion points out, California courts have
consistently enforced this rule. See, e.g., Jones v. Ayers, 212 Cal. App. 2d 646,
28 Cal. Rptr. 223 (Ct. App. 1963) ; Nault v. Smith, 194 Cal. App. 2d 257, 14
Cal. Rptr. 889 (Ct App. 1961).
19. Presumably the court accepts the reasoning of Harper and Kime with
regard to the master-servant relationship and the factor of control:
The relationship of master and servant . . . affords the master

in some instances a peculiar ability to control the conduct of the
servant even beyond the ambit of activity commonly designated as
the scope of the employment. Some acts are so clearly disconnected with the purpose of the employment and so exclusively
done by the servant on his own account that they are dearly not
of a character such as to make the master liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Nevertheless, these acts may be so
connected with the employment in time and place as to give the
master a special opportunity to control the servant's conduct.
(Emphasis added).
Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YAxz L.J.
886, 896 (1934).
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situation seemingly presents an accurate parallel. The court,
however, treats it only summarily as if viewing it as having
limited relevance. At the same time it is possible that the
court was only one short step away from a remedy by eliminating the entrustment doctrine's requirement of ownership by the
defendant.
The effect that Brockett will have upon subsequent litigation
is difficult to determine. The result seems to be a good one,
not unrelated to the pattern of judicial erosion affecting established principles of nonfeasance and nonliability. 20 The opinion
itself, however, is unconvincing. While the elements considered
by the court, taken in the aggregate, seem to lead irresistibly to
liability, the doctrinal underpinnings are not clearly established.
The ultimate effect of the decision may be to provide a remedy
where none existed before, presumably by broadening the scope
of the affirmative duty concept. There will, however, be innumerable grounds for later courts to distinguish. In Brockett
the driver's youth, his special relationship as an employee, his
own criminal behavior and the actions of his employer, his
prior possession of the car (as distinguished from an entrustment of it to him), and the affirmative conduct of the employer
are all factors of some significance; but the emphasis that may
be placed on each is not ascertainable. It may be concluded,
therefore, that the court reached a desirable, perhaps inevitable,
result by means of a questionable tour de force.
HYMAN RuBN, JR.

20. See 2 F. HAPuER & F. JAmES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.6 (1956); W.
PRoSsml, HANDnOK OF THE LAW oi Tors § 54 (3d ed. 1964).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss2/10

14

et al.: Recent Decisions
1969]

RECE-NT DECISIONS

TORTS-Liability of Owner or Possessor of Land-The status
of an injured party as trespasser, licensee, or invitee is not
determinative of liability of an occupier of land. Rowland v.
Christian, (Cal. 1968).
Plaintiff, a social guest in the defendant's apartment, was
injured when the porcelain handle on a water faucet in the
defendant's bathroom broke in his hand. The defendant knew
of this concealed defect in the premises and was aware of the
fact that the plaintiff would come into contact with it. The
plaintiff brought an action to recover damages resulting from
the defendant's negligence in failing to warn him of the dangerous condition. The Superior Court for the City and County of
San Francisco entered summary judgment for the defendant,
and the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court of California,
sitting en banc, reversed, stating that
[t]he proper test to be applied to the liability of the
possessor of land . . . is whether in the management of
his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view
of the probability of injury to others, and, although
the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee
may in the light of facts giving rise to such status have
some bearing on the question of liability, the status is not
determinative.' Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561,
TO Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
The traditional approach to problems involving the liability
of owners and occupiers of land has placed persons entering
upon the land into three classes and has distinguished accordingly the duties owed to each by the occupier. These three
classes of entrants have been trespassers, licensees, and invitees.2
Generally speaking, those entering the land without permission
or without the right to do so have been classified as trespassers.
Those who enter with the occupier's permission but whose entry
is not connected with the occupier's business interest, such as
a social guest,3 have been classified as licensees. 4 The third
1. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968).
2. Placing entrants upon land into three separate classes is a common law
limitation on the fundamental theory of liability and has its roots in an era
when legal developments were dominated by the English landowning class.
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE: LAw OF TORTS 1430, 1432 (1956). See generally
Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Inzitee, Licensee, and Trespasser (pts. 1-2), 69 L.Q. Rnv. 182, 359 (1953).
3. 2 F. HARPER &F. JAMEs, THE LAW OF TORTS 1477 (1956). See generally
Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MiNN. L. REv. 573 (1942).
4. 2 F. HARPE & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF ToRTs 1431 (1956).
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category, the invitee, has contained those whose entrance serves
the business interest of the occupier, or those whose entrance
has been encouraged by conduct of the occupier leading them to
believe that the land has been prepared for their safety.5
The general rule has been that the occupier owes the trespasser no duty except to refrain from wanton and willful injury.
The occupier has generally owed the licensee no duty except to
warn him of concealed dangers on the premises of which the
occupier is aware and to refrain from unreasonably dangerous
active conduct. The general approach has subjected the occupier
to the highest standard of care when the entrant is classified as
an invitee. The occupier has owed the invitee the duty to discover unreasonably dangerous conditions and to either remedy
them or warn him.,
Before Rowland the California judiciary had also distinguished the duties owed by the occupier according to the type of
"visitor" to his property. In making these distinctions, however, California had not accepted the general rule with respect
to licensees. With two judicially created exceptions, it had considered the duty owed to the licensee the same as that owed
the trespasser-to refrain from willful and wanton injury. 7
In R owland the California court redefined the duty owed to
the licensee by the occupier. More significant, however, was the
redefinition by the court of the basic precept of different duties
owed by an occupier to different classes of visitors. To understand this redefinition it is necessary to examine the prior
California approach to the duty owed a licensee and its two
exceptions.
An increasing concern for human safety led California to
make an exception to the rule of limited liability to licensees
when active conduct was involved." The prevailing view in
California was that in situations involving active conduct of
5. Id.

6. Id; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342 (1966). South Carolina
apparently follows the general rule with respect to the duty owed by the
occupier to licensees. Frankel v. Kertz, 239 F. Supp. 713 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
7. Palmquist v. Mercer, 43 Cal. 2d 92, 272 P.2d 26 (1954). See also Hansen v. Richey, 237 Cal. App. 2d 475, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909 (Dist. Ct App. 1965),
in which the California court rejected the view advanced by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 342, which is the general rule elsewhere, that the occupier
has a duty to warn the licensee of concealed dangers of which the occupier
is aware.
8. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 388-89 (3d ed. 1964).
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the occupier, rather than a condition of the premises, the landowner had a duty to exercise ordinary care toward a licensee
whose presence was known or reasonably should have been
known to the owner. 9 When conduct was determined to be
active negligence, the common law distinctions were disregarded, and the occupier had a duty to exercise ordinary care. 10
In Hansen v. Richey,"1 the court said that if the jury found
negligence, it would find it not in the maintenance of a
dangerous swimming pool, but "in the active conduct of a party
for a large number of youthful guests in the light of knowledge of the dangerous pool."' 2 Likewise, in Howard V.
Howard3 where the plaintiff was injured by slipping on spilled
grease, active negligence was found in the defendant's request
that the plaintiff enter the kitchen by a route which the defendant knew would be dangerous, and in the defendant's failure to
warn her of the dangerous condition.
Another exception to the general rule limiting liability was
employed when the condition of the premises amounted to a
trap. A trap had been defined as "a concealed danger known
to the defendant, that is, a danger clothed with a deceptive
appearance of safety. 114 The trap theory, however, was usually
limited to situations similar to those involving a spring trap. 1
The lack of definiteness involved in the trap theory of liability,
therefore making its use unsatisfactory and argumentative, was
pointed out in Anderson v. Anderson.'6
An examination of the cases dealing with the active negligence
and trap exceptions reveals the confusion and subtleties which
had resulted from the application of the common law principles
governing liability of the possessor of land.17 There also seems
9. Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d 133, 148 P.2d 19 (1944).
10. Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 2d 91, 219 P.2d
73 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950).

11. 237 Cal. App. 2d 475, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909 (Dist. Ct App. 1965).

12. Id. at 481, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
13. 186 Cal. App. 2d 622, 9 Cal. Rptr. 311 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).

14. Hansen v. Richey, 237 Cal. App. 2d 475, 480, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909, 912

(Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
15. Anderson v. Anderson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 409, 59 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1967).
16. Id. The court explained that the theory of a trap as the basis for liability
of a land-owner dealt originally with the sort of trap involved when, in 1822,
a man saw this warning posted in a garden: "Paradise Place: Spring guns
and steel traps are set here." The court said that the application of the term
to any other situation makes its use unsatisfactory.
17. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
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to have been confusion and conflict as to the definitions of trespasser, licensee, and invitee.18 In Fernandez v. Consolidated
Fisheries,Iw., 19 a California court called the common law approach unrealistic, arbitrary, and inelastic. The court noted that
it was almost impossible to perceive the point at which duties
toward each of the classes began or ended, or where the duty
not to act became supplemented by the duty to act.
In Rowland the criticism of the common law distinctions was
that they obscured the proper considerations which should
20
govern determination of the question of duty.

[T]he immunities from liability predicated upon these
classifications . . .often do not reflect the major fac-

tors which should determine whether immunity should
be conferred upon the possessor of land. Some of those
factors, including the closeness of the connection between the injury and the defendant's conduct, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of
preventing future harm, and the prevalence and availability of insurance, bear little, if any, relationship to
the classifications of trespasser, licensee and invitee and
the existing rules conferring immunity.21
In rejecting the traditional system of classifications, the court
in Rowland pointed out that "the basic policy of this state set
forth by the legislature in Section 1714 of the Civil Code is
that everyone is responsible for an injury caused to another by
his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his
property." 22 Until Fernandez2 3 California had applied the
common law rule rather than the civil law rule embodied in
Section 1714 of the California Civil Code.24 It was again
argued successfully in Rowland that Section 1714 stated a fun18. Id. at 556, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
19. 98 Cal. App. 2d 91, 219 P.2d 73 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950).

20.
21.
22.
23.

Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1968).
Id.
Id. at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 2d 91, 219 P.2d

73 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950).
24. CAL. CIVIL CoDE ANN. § 1714 (West 1954) reads:
Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of willful acts, but
also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary
care or skill in the management of his property or person, except
so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care,
brought the injury upon himself.
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damental principle of liability for negligent conduct and that
any departure from it had to be justified by public policy.25
In certain situations some courts have disregarded common
law categorization and applied the ordinary principles of
negligence. 26 The courts in most states, moreover, would have
probably reached the same result as Rowland in view of the
general rule today that the occupier owes the licensee the duty
to warn him of dangerous conditions of which the occupier is
aware. 27 The same result probably could have been reached in
California under a strained construction of the active negligence
theory or possibly under the trap theory.28 The use of further
fictions to avoid injustice, however, would have probably resulted in greater complexity and confusion.2 9
Rowland seems to reflect the current trend toward more
comprehensive application of the requirement of reasonable
care under all circumstances. 30 By rejecting the rigid classifications of the common law, the court is free to base its determination of the occupier's liability on more important considerations. The trend toward rejection of the common law distinctions is buttressed by the fact that these distinctions have been
repudiated in England, the jurisdiction of their birth. 81
Rowland's impact on other jurisdictions, however, may be
somewhat limited by the fact that California has in its Civil
Code a fundamental scheme of liability for all negligent
82
conduct
JosmEH F. SINmLEToN

25. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). The
validity of the argument had previously been recognized in Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 462, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 94 (1961).

26. E.g., Gould v. DeBeve, 330 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Anderson v.
Anderson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 409, 59 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Dist. Ct App. 1967);
Scheivel v. Lipton, 156 Ohio St. 308, 102 N.E2d 453 (1951); see Comment,
The Outmoded Distinction Between Licensees and Invitees, 22 Mo. L. REV.

186 (1957).
27. See Annot., 55 A.L.R2d 525 (1957).
28. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 105 (1968).
29. Id.
30. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAES, TE LAW oF TORTS 1432 (1956).
31. Occupier's Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31 (1957).

32. See CAi. CiViL CoDE Awx. § 1714 (West 1954).
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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-Article Nine-A house
trailer is a "motor vehicle" under Uniform Commercial Code
§ 9-302(1) (d) for which a financing statement must be filed to
perfect a security interest. In re Vinarsky (N.D.N.Y. 1968).
Vinarsky, a bankrupt, had bought a mobile home in New York
under a retail installment contract. The petitioner-bank obtained assignment of the contract and provided financing. The
bankrupt had brought the mobile home to Binghampton, N. Y.,
where it was set upon concrete block piers. No financing statement pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code was filed in
the Secretary of State's office or the county clerk's office. The
referee ruled that since there was no compliance with UCC
filing requirements, the lien arising from the security instrument
running to the bank was null and void, and subordinate to the
lien of the trustee in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act.1
The bank and other financing institutions which appeared
as amici curiae contended that the mobile home was "consumer
goods," which are exempted from filing requirements necessary
to perfect security interests under Section 9-302 of the UCC.2
But the district court for the Northern District of New York,
adopting a definition of "motor vehicle" from the state's personal property law, 3 held that a house trailer is a motor vehicle
and subject specifically to filing to perfect a security interest.
In re Vinarsey, 287 F. Supp. 446 (N.D.N.Y. 1968).
They are as much a part of modern suburbia as ticky-tacky
subdivisions and quick-rise apartments. They follow hard on
the heels of the bulldozers at any major construction site. They
congregate in instant communities and constitute the pup tent
of the mobile society. They are the mobile homes; and while
this half-house, half-vehicle has had no trouble fitting into
modern American life, it has posed rather intricate problems in
finding its proper niche in the law.
1. 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1964).
2. N.Y. UCC § 9-302(1) (McKinney 1964) provides:
A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests

except the following ...
(d) a purchase money security interest
in consumer goods; but filing is required to perfect such a security
interest in a motor vehicle required to be licensed or registered in

this state ....

3. N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAw § 9-301 (1) (McKinney 1962) provides:
"'Motor vehicle' or 'vehicle' means any device propelled or drawn by any
power other than muscular power, upon or by which any person or property
is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway, road or street"
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The Vinarsky court was faced with the precise problem of
fitting the mobile home into one of two conflicting pigeonholes;
either "consumer goods" or "motor vehicle." The question was
not merely one of semantics, for UCO 9-302(1) (d) 4 requires
filing to perfect a security interest in motor vehicles, but
exempts consumer goods from the filing requirement. Thus, this
court's decision in favor of the motor vehicle classification was
of vital significance in the area of secured transactions.
The federal court, finding no interpretation of the issue from
the highest New York court, had to look to two conflicting
lower court decisions to make its Erie-required educated guess
as to the applicable state law. Under similar fact situations as
in Vinarsky, Recckio v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co.;
had held that a mobile home was "consumer goods"; Albany
Discount Corp. v. Mohawk National Bank6 had decided that a
house trailer was a "motor vehicle."
The conflict between the two decisions was largely one of
definition-snatching. Since the UCC chose not to define "motor
vehicle," the lower courts ran scurrying into the state statutes
to find applicable definitions of the term.
The chase in ReccAio landed in the New York Vehicle and
Traffic Law, where the court examined Section 1257 and concluded: "[Bly the definition of the Vehicle & Traffic Law as
well as by commonly accepted usage a motor vehicle would
appear to require some sort of self-propulsion. This mobile
home is not a self-propelled vehicle and does not have any power
of its own." 8 The court decided that it would be too tight a
squeeze to fit a mobile home into this concept and found that
4. N.Y. UCC

§ 9-302(1) (McKinney 1964), set out supra, note 2.

5. 55 Misc. 2d 788, 286 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
6. 54 Misc. 2d 238, 282 N.Y.S2d 401 (Sup. Ct. 1967), modified, 30 A.D.2d
623, 290 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1968), inem. recalled and order aff'd, 30 A.D.2d 919,
292 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1968).
7. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAm ic LAW § 125 (McKinney Supp. 1968) defines
"motor vehicle" as "[e]very vehicle ...
operated or driven upon a public
highway by any power other than muscular power .... "
8. 55 Misc. 2d 788, 286 N.Y.S.2d 390, 394 (Sup. Ct 1968). Apparently the
Vinarsky court confused this case. Judge Foley cites Recchio as holding "that
the mobile home involved there was a self-propelled vehicle and, having power

of its own, is not a motor vehicle," 287 F. Supp. 446, 447 (1968), whereas the
actual holding of the case was that the mobile home was not self-propelled and
did not have its own power. But Foley correctly concluded that Recchio held

the mobile home not to be a motor vehicle, so the discrepancy in reasoning did
not affect the Vinarsky decision.
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"9consumer goods" as defined in UCO 9-1099 was a more comfortable glove.
The search in Albany Discount found fruition in the New
York Personal Property Law, which included both "motor
vehicle" and "vehicle" in the same definition."0 This definition
clearly included house trailers for the purposes of security
transactions, the court concluded. It circumvented the "consumer goods" imbroglio by reasoning that, though a house
trailer may be "consumer goods" within the scope of UCC 9-109,
Section 9-302(1) (d) requires filing with respect to motor
vehicles regardless of whether they are consumer goods.
Judge Foley found the Albany Discount analysis more appealing and followed its reasoning in Finarsky. Like Judge
Crangle in Albany Discount, Judge Foley found it unnecessary
to explore the area of the broad definition of "consumer goods":
"[M]y decision is placed solely upon the holding a trailer is a
motor vehicle and subject specifically to filing to perfect the
u
security interest.""
The court based its decision on the broad Personal Property
Law definition which included "motor vehicle" and "vehicle"
in the same classification, rather than on the more particularized
Vehicle and Traffic Law which distinguished between "motor
vehicle" and "trailer." Judge Foley's reasoning for selecting
the former definition is convincing:
The significant difference is that Art. 9, § 301(1)
of the New York Personal Property Law combining
motor vehicle and vehicle in the same type definition
. . . has much more relevant and intimate contact with
the Uniform Commercial Code to determine what the
legislative intent was when only the words "motor
vehicle" were used in UCC Art. 9-302(1) (d). Great
significance, in my judgment, must be accorded to the
Personal Property Law definition in Art. 9-301(1)
inasmuch as it is one of the few provisions in the New
York Personal Property Law not repealed by the new
9. N.Y. UCC § 9-109 (McKinney 1964) provides: "Goods are (1) 'con-

sumer goods' if they are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family
or household purposes."
10. N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 9-301(1) (McKinney 1962), set out

sipra note 3.

11. It re Vinarsky, 287 F. Supp. 446, 448 (1968).
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Commercial Code. If any Statutes are to be read into
the Uniform Commercial Code involved here, or at
least in conjunction with it, I would think this unrepealed article of the Personal Property Law generally
entitled "Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Act" overrides selection of other New York Statutes for com12

parison.

Thus the court decided, in effect, that the provision of the
state's personal property law, which dealt specifically with
motor vehicle installment sales and which was unrepealed by
the UCC, was more in pa'i materi with the UCC article on
secured transactions than the provision of the state's vehicle
and traffic law.
Vinarsky, however, may be an oversimplification of the problem. The federal opinion, though powerful persuasion on the
issue in New York, may be of little precedential value elsewhere
because of the uniqueness of the New York law in this area.
New York UCC 9-302(3) indicates that Article Nine's filing
provisions do not apply to a security interest in a motor vehicle
for which a certificate of title is required under the state
statutes. 13 The purpose of this subsection, as envisioned by the
drafters of the UCC, was to allow state motor vehicle laws
which permitted or required the notation of encumbrances on
the vehicle's certificate of title to continue to operate, unaffect12. Id. at 448-49.

13. N.Y. UCC § 9-302(3) (McKinney 1964) provides:
The filing provisions of this Article do not apply to a security
interest in property subject to a statute ....
(b) of this state which provides for central filing of security
interests in such property, or in a motor vehicle which is not inventory held for sale for which a certificate of title is required
under the statutes of this state if a notation of such a security
interest can be indicated by a public official on a certificate or a
duplicate thereof.
UmrFolm ComMEcLA. CoDE: § 9-302 Official Text (1962) has two alternatives

for subsection (3)(b). The New York UCC adopted Alternative B (set out
supra); the South Carolina UCC adopted an alteration of Alternative A:
(b) of this state which provides for central filing of, or which
requires indication on a certificate of title of, such security interests in such property, including, but not limited to, the filing provisions of Section 60-252, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962,
for a security interest in property of any description or any interest therein created by a mortgage made by a railroad company
as defined in Section 58-852, Code of Laws of South Carolina,

1962.
S.C. CODE ANK. § 10.9-302(3)(b) (Supp. 1966). A South Carolina amendment added to the Official Text all the provisions following the word
"including."
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ed by the UCC.14 This would eliminate a duplication of filing

systems, since most state motor vehicle laws provide their own
method of perfecting security interests in such property. Thus
it would appear that Section 9-302(3) (b) would be the controlling section in the Yinarsky dispute, not Section 9-302(1) (d).
Why did not the court consider it?
The answer is simple. New York has no central motor vehicle
certificate of title system. As the Practice Commentary to the
New York UCC 9-302 says, "the most important application of
subsecs. (3) and (4) of this section is to preserve motor vehicle
certificate of title systems and related central filing, but this application does not concern New York, which has no such
system."' 6
Thus Section 9-302(3) is virtually a dead letter in New York,
and played no part in determining the issue of how to perfect a
security interest in a mobile home. JVinarsky, Abany Discount,
and Recchio declined to even cite the subsection, and properly so.
Elsewhere, Section 9-302(3) is alive and healthy, with more
of the intended result. Two decisions of the Georgia Court of
Appeals, one specifically involving a mobile home transaction,
have affirmed that the section excludes motor vehicle transactions from the filing provisions of UCC's Article Nine. 16 A
federal district court in Missouri stated, in light of a state
statute which provided the exclusive method for perfecting a
security interest in a motor vehicle, that "the filing provisions
14.

In the case of a motor vehicle which is required to be licensed
under the motor vehicle law of the state, filing under the Article is
required even where the motor vehicle is categorized as consumer
goods or farm equipment, unless the motor vehicle law of the state
permits or requires notation of encumbrances on the certificate of
title of the vehicle. If the motor vehicle law provides for notation
of encumbrances upon the certificate of title, perfection may be
accomplished under the Article in no other way but by compliance
with the motor vehicle certificate of title law.

0. SPIVACK, SEcuRED TRANSACrIONS 85 (1963).

15. Kripke, Practice Commentary, N.Y. UCC § 9-302 (McKinney 1964).

16. Wooden v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App. 852, 162 S.E.2d 222
(1968) (claimant, supplier of furnaces for mobile homes who failed to perfect
security interest under Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act, not permitted
to assert claim to furnaces against defendant, a perfected creditor, who foreclosed on recorded mortgages); Guardian Discount Co. v. Settles, 114 Ga.
App. 418, 151 S.E.2d 530 (1966) ("The filing provisions of Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code generally have no application to motor vehicles in
the State of Georgia required to be registered under the Motor Vehicle
Certificate of Title Act

..

."

but UCC held to apply because security interest

was created by a dealer).
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of the Code have no application to motor vehicles and the perfection of liens therein."'1 7 Kentucky appears to fall more in line
with the New York situation. The court of appeals of that
state determined that in spite of Section 9-302(3), vehicles to
which the Kentucky motor vehicle registration statute applied
are not removed from the operation of the UCC.18
What is the state of the law in South Carolina with respect
to Section 9-302? There is authoritative opinion that Section
9-302(3) bears its intended weight in this jurisdiction, and
that the motor vehicle title law regarding liens continues in
effect, unchanged by the UCC.1 9 No doubt this revelation causes
no joy to the South Carolina practitioner, for the status of a
mobile home is somewhat less than lucid under the state's certificate of title act, and a search for a clear statutory guidepost
sends the researcher through a thumb-tiring expedition into the
Code.
The jumping-off point is Section 46-150.42, which is the basic
motor vehicle perfection of security interest provision. This
section provides that "a security interest in a vehicle of a type
for which a certificate of title is required is not valid against
creditors of the owner or subsequent transferees or lienholders
of the vehicle unless perfected as provided for in this article. No
other recordation shall be necessary to protect the interest of
the lienholder."20
This statute raises the immediate query: What is a "vehicle of
a type for which a certificate of title is required?" Section
46-11 gives a clue: "Every motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer,
pole trailer and special mobile equipment vehicle driven, operated or moved upon a highway in this State shall be registered
and licensed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter." 21
And Section 46-14.1 provides that "the Department shall not
register . . .a vehicle unless a certificate of title has been issued

by the Department to the owner or an application therefor has
17. In re Jackson, 268 F. Supp. 434, 437 (F-D. Mo. 1967).
18. Lincoln Bank & Trust v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. Ct App. 1961).
19. 1966-67 Ops. Arr'y GEN. 195; accord, S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-302
(1966) (South Carolina Reporter's Comments) ; Symposim-Seciered Finan-cing Under Article 9 of the Uniforn Commercial Code, 19 S.C.L. REv. 681,
720 (1967).
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-150.42 (1962).
21. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 46-11 (1962).
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been delivered by the owner to the Department." 22 Finally,
Section 46-150.43 adds that "[a] security interest is perfected by
the delivery to the Department of the existing certificate of title
. * **)28 A reasonable synthesis from this statutory maze
is that vehicles, including motor vehicles and trailers, which are
operated on the state's roads must be registered with the highway department; a certificate of title is essential for such
registration; and a security interest in such vehicles is perfected by delivering the certificate of title to the department.
Finally, Section 46-35.3, which provides for a six dollar fee
for house trailers, defines "house trailer" as a trailer "which
is designed, constructed and equipped as a dwelling, living
abode, or sleeping place, either permanently or temporarily, and
is equipped for use as a conveyance on streets or high-

ways ....

),24

In spite of these legislative enactments, the picture remains
muddy. Is a mobile home attached to a foundation a vehicle
"driven, operated or moved upon a highway. "25 Is a house
trailer with wheels removed and hooked into the utilities
"equipped for use as a conveyance on streets or highways." 26
Article 9.1, a recent addition to the motor vehicle chapter of
the Code, clouds the issue further. This legislation levies a two
dollar licensing fee, payable to the county of location within
fifteen days after mobile homes are purchased or brought into
the state for business or dwelling purposes. 2 7 One section of
the article provides, however, that "the provisions of this article
shall not be applicable if the mobile home or house trailer is
licensed by the South Carolina Highway Department."2" Shortly after this article was passed, the state attorney general was
asked whether a license under the act was required if the trailer
wheels have been removed and the trailer placed on a permanent foundation. The reply was this:
It has been ruled by the Tax Commission that house
trailers from which wheels have been removed and
22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-14.1 (1962).
23. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-150.43 (1962).
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-35.3 (1962).
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-11 (1962).
26. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-35.3 (1962).

27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-100 to -100.7 (Supp. 1968).

28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-100.4 (Supp. 1968).
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which have been placed on permanent foundations are
no longer vehicles subject to taxation as personal property. Atty. Gen. Lr. to Hon. Robert S. Floyd, dtd.
Oct. 8, 1964.
Such houses are part of the realty, and are no longer
mobile house trailers. It is the opinion of this Office
that such house trailers are not subject to the license fee
imposed by Act 818,29 if they are attached to the land
and made part of the realty within fifteen days
after they are purchased or brought into this state. 0
Thus the attorney general's opinion that mobile homes attached to the land are realty ushers forth another problem.
The UCO article on secured transactions specifically exempts
real estate liens from its application;3I1 therefore, security
interests in house trailers so attached should be perfected, apparently, not in pursuance to the UCC at all, but in accordance
with the standard recording act.812 The quandries arising from

such a construction are obvious: when a mobile home vendor
sells a trailer under an installment contract, how is he to know
whether his vendee will keep the trailer in a position to be
operated upon the highways, in which case the vendor should
perfect his security interest in accordance with the motor
vehicle certificate of title act, or whether the purchaser will
attach the trailer to a permanent foundation within fifteen
days, in which case the vendor should perfect his security in83
terest as a normal real estate mortgage?
Therefore, in spite of the foregoing statutes and considered
opinions, the basic question remains an open one in South Carolina: Is a mobile home a vehicle of the type for which a cer29. LII S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 2181 (No. 881, 1962) is the session law
version of S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-100 to -100.7 (Supp. 1968).
30. 1964-65 Ors. ATT'Y GEN. 263. The attorney general's opinion that mobile
homes attached to the land are realty accords with two cases construing mobile
home zoning ordinances. Morin v. Zoning Board of Review, 232 A.2d 393
(R.I. 1967) (mobile home with wheels removed, set on foundation, hooked
into cesspool and connected to electricity, telephone and water held neither a
vehicle nor a portable structure, but a family unit or dwelling unit) ; Douglass
Township v. Badman, 206 Pa. Super. 390, 213 A.2d 88 (1965) (mobile home
with wheels removed and placed on a permanent foundation held not to be
portable and therefore no longer a mobile home under the ordinance).
31. S.C. CODE, ANN. § 10.9-104 (Supp. 1966).
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 60-101 (1962).
33. It should be obvious that, for complete protection, a vendor could file
both.
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tificate of title must be filed with the highway department to
perfect the security interest?
The Florida Supreme Court in Palethorpe v. Thomson3 4 has
risen above the legislative quagmire of the foregoing conflict
and has arrived at the most logical conclusion for disposing of
the problem. Although the case involved an ad valorem tangible
personal property tax rather than a consideration of secured
transactions, it construed a statute which exempted mobile
homes used for housing accommodations from the personal property tax imposed if the owners had bought motor vehicle
license tags for their house trailers.3 5 The court said:
Historically, the long adhered to definitions of a
motor vehicle appearing in the statutes and enunciated
in the court decisions of our state and as understood by
the public connote something other than a house trailer
which is not self-propelled and is used primarily for
36
housing accommodations.
We cannot seriously entertain the view that the people of Florida when they adopted Section 13, Article
IX,

37

understood or intended to mean that coach or

house trailers primarily devoted to housing accommodations were per se "motor vehicles" under said constitutional provision.38
The court went on to distinguish between trailers used "for
housing accommodations or for other non-transportation pur-,
poses" in which the trailer "loses its primary character as a
unit of motor vehicle transport," and a trailer "when it is drawn
or is capable of being drawn by an automobile or other motor
vehicle primarily to carry persons or property over the public
highways."3 9 The court classified the former category as personal property, to which the constitutional motor vehicle exemption did not apply; it classified the latter as a motor
vehicle. Judge Ervin reversed the state circuit court and held
34. 171 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1965).
35. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. §

46-100.4 (Supp. 1968).

36. 171 So. 2d 526, 529 (Fla. 1965).
37. "Motor vehicles, as property, shall be subject to only one form of taxation which shall be a license tax for the operation of such motor vehicles ...
and shall be in lieu of all ad valorem taxes assessable against motor vehicles
as personal property." FLA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 13.
38. 171 So. 2d 526, 530 (Fla. 1965).
39. Id. at 531.
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that trailers used primarily as housing or other non-transportation facilities are subject to the ad valorem tangible personal
property tax, notwithstanding the statutory exemption. The
statute would be constitutional only as applied to trailers used
primarily as motor vehicle units, and not otherwise.
The court, in basing its decision on the use to which the
mobile home is applied, seizes upon the only valid distinction
which can be made in attempting to classify this property. The
trailer is a motor vehicle if its use is such that it can be drawn
over the public highways, which is not inconsistent with the
South Carolina registration statute encompassing vehicles
"driven, operated or moved upon a highway."40 Although the
Florida court classifies a mobile home attached to the land as
personalty, as compared to the South Carolina Attorney General's classification of such a use as realty, each construction is
consistent in recognizing that a mobile home so used is no longer
a motor vehicle.
What counseling advice should be given to the South Carolina
lienholder who wishes to perfect his security interest in a mobile
home ? In spite of the Vinarsky decision, which is at any rate
distinguishable in South Carolina because of the variance in
the New York and South Carolina registration requirements,
there seems to be enough persuasive authority-the "driven,
operated or moved upon a highway" requirement,4 1 the "equipped for use as a conveyance" phrase in the Code definition of
"house trailer,"4 2 the attorney general's classification of the
attached mobile home as realty,43 and decisions such as
Paethorpe44 -to establish that a mobile home permanently fixed
to the land is not a motor vehicle, and therefore not subject to
security interest perfection through the motor vehicle certificate of title provisions. An equally reasonable conclusion from
this study is that a mobile home which is used or kept in condition for use on the highways is a motor vehicle, for which perfection must be obtained through motor vehicle law. Such a
distinction seems to put an unfair and high burden on the
mobile home vendor to foresee his purchaser's use of the product.
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-11 (1962).

41. Id.

42. S.C.

CoDE ANN. § 46-35.3
GEN.

43. 1964-65 Ops. ATT'Y

(1962).

263.
44. 171 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1965).
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Unless the vendor is certain that his vendee is going to "convert" the trailer into realty, it would probably be a good safety
measure for the retailer to comply with the filing requirements of the motor vehicle law.
CHAIS E. HML
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